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INDUSTRIAL LAW CASES 
REGISTRATION OF UNREGISTERED SOCIETY: 
APP EAL AGAINST REGISTRAR'S DECISION 
Well ington Union of Advertising Workers Society v New Zealand Sales 
Advertising Representatives Guild I.U.W. 
Industrial Court, Wellington. 17 October, 1977. (I.C. 48177). Jamieson J. 
Regional rivalry between Auckland and 
Wellington is at tho heart of this dispute. 
although it came to the Court in the guise 
of an appeal from the refusal of the Regi-
strar of Industrial Unions to register the 
appellant society. The Regrstrar found that 
the members of the applicant Wellington 
socrety might conveniently belong to the 
exrstrng national umon, the Respondent in 
this actron. The Socrety appealed to Court 
under s 168 (6) of the Industrial Relations 
Act 1973. and the Court noted that the 
Society had the burden of provrng, per s 
168 {7). that 'having regard to distance, 
diversity of rnterest, or other substantial 
ground. rt will be more convenient for the 
members of the Society to register separ-
ately as a unron than to belong to the 
existing union 
Sellers of newspaper advertrstng seem 
organrzed only tn Auckland and Wellington, 
as there was no evrdence before the Court 
of membershrp from outside those two 
centres The orrgms of the national union 
lte rn the regrstratron of a northern drstnct 
regronal unron rn 1975, whrch was called 
the Wilson and Horton Ltmrted Sales 
Advertrsrng Representatives Guild I U.W 
As rs obvrous from the name. thrs was a 
local unron domrnated by the employees of 
one large employer Both the Wellrngton 
society and the Auckland drstrrct local 
unron wanted a national unron - but ap-
parently only rf rt was based and controlled 
rn !herr distrrct In sprte of a clear geo-
graphical advantage, the Wellingtonians 
lost the race to the courthouse (that rs. to 
the Rogrstrar's offrce), and the Auckland 
drstrict unron was converted into a natrona! 
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union in August 1976. 
The appellant Wellington Society claimed 
that the rules of the Auckland-based 
naticnal union unfairly discriminated in 
favour of Aucklanders, and cited Ship· 
masters Association of N.Z. v Registrar of 
Industrial Unions 4 B.A. 259, for the prin-
ciple that rf an existing union has drawn 
up its rules so as to exclude a particular 
group from the management of the union . 
then that group rs entitled to form their 
own union. In this case the "nationa l" 
union is really a small homogeneous group 
located in Auckland and a similar group 
based in Wellington, and the benefits of 
naltonar coverage are largely illusory 
There can be neither full-time sta ff nor 
adequate expenditure on travel. and virtu-
ally no service extended to Wellington 
Jamreson J seemed sympathetic toward 
the Wellington dissidents. and expressed 
the hope that suitable amendments mrght 
be made to allow for executive participation 
outside Auckland He noted, however, that 
a national union had to be based some-
where (resisting the Solomonic suggestion 
that the national headquarters ought to be 
rn, say, Ohakune, mrdway between the two 
North Island centres). The Court concluded 
that the Wellington Society had not dis-
charged its burden of proof under s 168 
(7) and declined to reverse the decision of 
the Registrar. 
Other appeals agarnst the Registrar's 
dec1s1on are noted at (1976) 1 NZJtR 45. 
(1977) 2 NZJIR 103, and (1978) 3 NZJIR 
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CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT OR INDEPENDENT 
CONTRACTOR 
MacKenzie (Inspector of Awards) v Rotor-ua District Veterinary Club Inc. 
lndustnal Court, Rotorua. 29 March 1978 (I. C. 11 /78). Jamieson J. 
The facts in th1s case are remarkably 
similar lo those in the Bay of Islands 
Veterinary Service case. 75 B A 5151 
noted at (1975) 1 N Z. Recent Law (N.S.) 
312. Both cases concern a group of 
veterinarians who needed an answenng 
service, after-hours and weekends. In each 
case the vetennarians contracted with a 
married woman to work from her home, 
and supplied her with radio-telephone com-
munications equipment, so that an on-duty, 
rostered veterinarian could be reached, 
even in the field, when a farmer needed 
urgent assistance. The employer maintain-
ed the equipment. paid the telephone bills, 
and paid the. worker a fixed sum at regular 
intervals (weekly in the Bay of Islands 
case, monthly in the Rotorua case). In 
neither case did the employer make any 
deductions for PAYE or otherwise from 
those regular payments. In both cases the 
plaintiff sought to prove that the woman 
was a clerical worker, due arrears of 
wages under a series of Awards. while the 
defendant attempted to show that the 
woman was an independent contractor not 
covered by any Award In both cases 
Jamieson J referred to the judgment of 
Blair J. 1n Perry v Satterthwaite (1967) NZLR 
719, and accepted that he should ''look 
broadly at the whole transaction. ' In the 
Bay of Islands case the worker entered 
into the contract by responding to a news-
paper advertisement, while in the instant 
case the worker shifted from full-time office 
clerical work for the same employer to the 
at-home answering serv1ce funct1on. 
In the former case the Court found a 
master-servant relat1onsh1p, co·,ered by the 
relevant award, wi11le 1n the mstant case 
lhe maJority of the Court camEO to the oppo-
Site conclusion. The rat1o of the instant 
dectston, to distingUish it from the former 
case (whtch was not referred to 1n the 
1udgment), was that the defendant's secre-
tary, a chartered accountant, had clearly 
attempted to convert an admitted contract 
of employment mto an Independent con-
tract. As the employee herself had been in 
some measure responsible for this change 
In status. she should have understood the 
new relationship, if for no other reason 
than that her pay cheque was now made 
up with no deductions 
In the Bay of Is lands case, the Court 
noted that it would be "vigilant" to guard 
against "devices" constructed to defeat the 
provisions ol an award To the extent that 
the Court was alert in 1975. it may have 
nodded here. Mr McDonnell was moved to 
say, 1n dissent. that the Court's decision 
was based primarily on the mode ol book-
keeping adopted by the defendant's char-
tAred accountant secretnry. The only other 
feature disttngOJishing these two cases Is 
that arrears of several hundred dollars only 
were at 1ssue 1n the former case, while 
the Inspector of Awards tn the instant case 
sought recovery of $70.621 35 arrears for 
some three years o: weekend work Th is 
incredible and excessive claim may have 
turned the Court against the claimant. ® 
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"MAFIA TYPE MOB RULE" AT OCEAN BEACH 
FREEZING WORKS 
O'Donnell v Ocean Beach Freezing Co. ltd 
Industrial Court, Dunedin. 29 March 1978 {I.C. 12/78). Jamieson J. 
O 'Donnell was d1sm1ssed by the employer 
on 25 November 1977 From the limited 
!acts wh1ch appear 1n this personal gnev-
ance application under section 117 (3A) 
ol the Industrial Relations Act 1973, Mr 
O'Donnell's union, the N Z . Engineering , 
Coachbuild1ng, Aircraft. Motor and Related 
Trades I.U .W., and Mr O'Donnell himself 
crnslde red the termination to be a section 
150 diSmissal. commonly referred to as 
VtCIImtsatlon. From the beginning of the 
dispute, the company urged the union to 
use sectJOn 117 personal grievance mach-
inery, but the union believed the matter 
to be a "union grievance. not a ·personal 
gnevance. Unaccountably, the union pur-
sued neither the section 117 mechanism 
nor the section 150 remedy 
that power) as analysed at 1 Halsbury , 4th 
ed., p. 34 The Court found. however, that 
It was not strictly necessary to exami ne the 
admlnistratrve law concerned, as the Instant 
application was not. and could not be, an 
appeal from the decision of a compulsory 
conference. Under section 120 (4) of the 
Act that deciston was ·rrnal and bindtng on 
the parttes 
The Court noted that the unton sought to 
use the personal gnevance machinery set 
out tn section 117 only after receiving the 
adverse dectsion of the compulsory con-
ference The Court also noted that both 
the company and the conciliator had 
expressly and repeatedly urged that the 
matter be dealt with as a personal griev-
ance. The Court concluded that this umon 
reversal was an opportunistic attempt "to 
have a second bite at the cherry o·oon-
nell's applicatron was therefore refused 
because the Court found that the pre-
conditions of subsection 3A were not 
satisfied_ But even if the application was 
technically well founded. the discretionary 
extension of leave to the appilcant would 
not be granted, considering the circum-
stances of this case 
Instead, a conciliator was prevailed 
upon to call a conciliator's conference 
under section 122 of the Act. Immediately 
thereafter the Mi'lister of Labour called a 
compulsory conference under section 120, 
appomtlng the same conciliator as Chair-
man of that con ference. The two confer-
ences wF>re held on successive days In 
January 1978, at Bluff, where the Ocean 
Beach works are located_ The conciliator 
reportf!d that he was subjected to "abuse, 
threats. and inttmidation·- which he con-
sidered to be "an endeavour to sway any 
decision·• which he might make. He also 
reported that there was a ' Mafia tvpe mob 
rule" at the works 
Because of these attacks. that conciliator 
appotnted a second conciliator to rnc~urre 
mto the dismtssal of O'Donnell . The second 
conciliator reported back that the dtsmis-
sal was IUS!tfted, and that frnding , bemg 
adopted by the f~rst concilrator, became 
the decisron of the Chairman of the com-
pulsory conference 
There wa some drscussion belore the 
Court regardmg the delegation of a Charr-
man·s powers. and the maxrm delegatus 
non palest delegare (the person to whom 
a power rs delegated may not sub-delegate 
82 
Other 1ndtv1dua1 applicatiOns under sec-
Iron 117 (3A) include the Dee case and 
the Franich case. noted at (1977) 2 NZJIR 
54 and (1977) 2 NZJIR 102. respectively 
It should be noted that the union "failed'' 
to pur~ue a sectton 117 remedy at the out-
set for tacttcal reasons. not because the 
unron had no sympathy for O'Donnell's 
case The alteration to section 117 as set 
out '" sectton 19 of the 1976 Amendment 
Act, does not refer to the motive of the 
recalcitrant unron. but only to the result 
of the "failure the worker is unable to 
have his grievance dealt wrth or dealt with 
promptly ' Unless the compulsory con-
ference can be said to have "dealt wtth 
h1s grrevance, • instead of a threatened 
stnke or lockout the decision 1n th1s case 
would better rest on the subsection 3A 
JUdicial dtscretton 0 
AIR NEW ZEALAND - SINGAPORE AIRLINES CHARTER 
AGREEMENT: 
EXCLUSION OF STEWARDS AND HOSTESSES I.U.W. 
Airline Stewards and Hostesses of N.Z.I.U.W. v Air New Zealand Ltd. 
Industrial Court, Wellington. 15 May 1978 (A.C. 5/78}. Jamieson C.J. 
Air New Zealand. the employer 1n this 
dispute, signed a DC 10 charter agreement 
with Singapore Airlines Ltd (SAL. - the 
Charterer) for a once-weekly, non-stop, 
return flight between Auckland and Singa-
pore. The owner (Atr New Zealand) was 
to provide the Charterer with any one of 
its eight DC 10 Series 30 aircraft, operat-
ing "in the livery of the Owner," with Air 
New Zealand pilots and engineers flying 
the aircraft under their respective agree-
ments with the employer The charter 
agreement was signed on 31 December 
1977, and was to be effecttve for the 31 
weeks between 3 April 1978 and 31 October 
1978 (unless extended by mutual consent) 
at $54,000 a week. The Charterer, S.A.L. , 
was to provide the cabin crew (stewards 
and hostesses), who were to " come under 
the direct command of the Owner's pilot 
In command on the Aircraft . ' The 
S.A.L. cabin crew also to " be responsible 
at all times to (the pilot) for the safe and 
efficient operation of the Aircraft. " 
The Atrline Stewards and Hostesses of 
N Z.t.U.W. considered their exclusion from 
an Air New Zealand aircraft operating out 
of Auckland to be , in effect, a lockout 
from their traditional workplace and a 
breach of their Collective Agreement A 
Disputes Committee was convened under 
the standard disputes clause set out in 
s 116 of the Industrial Relations Act, and 
reprinted as Clause 27 of the relevant 
Award , recorded at 76 BA 7033 The 
Chairman of that Committee referred the 
matter to the Arbitration Court, where it 
got a prompt hearing 
The employer suggested that the char-
tered flights were not an Air New Zealand 
operation at all. and that the Collective 
Agreement between Air New Zealand and 
the umon was not relevant to flight servi ces 
operated by Singapore Airlines, services 
operated pursuant to a bilateral Air Traffic 
Agreement between New Zealand and the 
Republic of Singapore. 
From the begmning. the union objected 
to the employer invoking the section 116 
" dispute of rights" mechanism. arguing 
that the questton of charter agreements 
was held back by the employer at the last 
dispute of interest conciliation . and that 
such charter agreements would be more 
nrooerly dealt with in the next dispute of 
interest. The union agreed that the dispute 
was technically a dtspute of right, because 
it was not "created with intent to procure 
a Collective Agreeme,t," but submitted 
that the dispute did not fall within the rubric 
of the section 116 model clause, as the 
contract of charter was not related to any 
matter dealt with in the Collective Agree-
ment . The union here relied on the judo-
men! of the Court of Appeal in A.H.I. N.Z. 
Glass Manufacturing Co. Ltd v North Island 
Electrical and Related Trades I.U.W., and 
the tudgment of the Industrial Court of the 
same name, noted at (1977) 3 NZJIR 38 
The Court retected this threshold proced-
ural argument, holding that the dispute 
was related to matters dealt with in Clause 
4 (a) of the "instrument" in question (76 
B.A. 7033), but not specifically and clearly 
dtsposed of by that clause . Clause 4 (a) 
reads as follows (in part)· 
. " The Company shall employ its 
fltght stewards and flight hostesses 
and they shall serve the Company in 
that capactty of flight steward or flight 
hostess whether tn New Zealand or in 
any other part of the world where the 
Company may from t ime to time be 
operating or to or from which the 
~~,:'~any ' s .~trcraft may require to be 
Alternatively, the union suggested that 
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rf tho Court found the disputes clause to 
be applicable, then the Court might exer-
Cise Its d1scretron not to hear the dispute, 
per the comment of Richmond P in the 
A. H.I. Glass Manufacturing case. on the 
ground that the question of cnarter agree-
ments was 'held back' by tne employer 
at drspute of rnterest conciliation. As the 
employer had raised the issue in concilra-
tron wrth both pilots and flight engineerJ 
unrons. and as the charter was announced 
to the unron a~ a fait accomp li, the union 
argued that only the Company could have 
rarsed it at conciliatron The union also 
noted that other charter agreements oper-
..;:rng out of Auckland. such dS Polynesian 
A1rlrnes, had employed New Zealand cabin 
c cws Mr Justrce Jamieson gave short 
r flit t this argument by sim~ly saying it 
could not •·rn fer from this that the topic 
was deliberately held back by the com-
pany." 
Having decided that the Disputes Com-
mittee was properly convened under the 
model disputes clause, and that there was 
no reason for the Court not to hear the 
d1spute, the Court then reJected the sub-
stantive claim of the union. in the terms of 
Clause 4 (a). sel out above. the Court 
found that the charter arrangement Involved 
neither a srtuatron where •·tne Company 
may be operatrng nor the status 
whereby ''the Company's aircraft may re-
qurro to be flown '' The Court drd not 
fully explain the non-relevance of the sec-
.. md phrase 
The Court reached its conclusion with the 
aid of the "Avratron section of Halsbury·s 
Laws ol England, Vol 2 (4th Ed.) al page 
546. wherern "wet' charters (those operat-
f'!d by the owner) are distinguished from 
drv charters {those operated by the char-
terer). The presence of A1r New Zealand 
prlots and engrneers. and A1r New Zealand 
decor po.nt towards a ''wet' charter, but 
commercral nsk taken by S.A L. , on a flight 
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ttOvert1sed as a Singapore flight with 
"temporary and superficial ornamentation 
about the passenger entrance to g1ve (the 
plane) the character of a Srrrgapore Air-
lrnes aircraft pornt toward a "dry" charter 
Jamieson J found that the "proposed char-
ter agreement does not readily fall into 
either of the categories discussed'' but that 
Clause 4 (a) could not be interpreted to 
gtve P1e unron exclusive coverage of such 
~.AL. flight services 
Other extra-legal matters which may 
have figured in the JUdiCial Ctilculus include 
the 1_7 million dollars rn overseas currency 
whrch New Zealand stood to lose if the 
agreement were threatened. tne fact that 
the agreement was temporary, and finally 
the fact that conciliation council proceed-
rngs for a New Collective Agreement for 
the union were "in trarn," with the union 
still able to amend its clarms. to discuss 
charters rn the forthcomtng negotiation 
The Court dtd not put the charter to the 
test by asktng who would be the decision 
maker - a senior Singapore executive or 
an Arr New Zealand employee - in case 
of critrcal weather conditions. mechanical 
problems. medical emergency, or cnmlnal 
behaviour by a passenger during flight 
The Court also did not consioer the em-
ployment contract of Air New Zealand cabin 
crew working on s1mikH flights. Auckland-
Tonga-Apia and return, on a Boein() 737 
chartered to Polynesran Airlines. By Its 
interpretation of Clause 4 (a}, those stew-
ards and hostesses must be outside award 
coveraae 
There was no apparent reference by 
etther party to cncillary foil Z le:g:slation 
such as responsibiltly for darl"ag~ under 
section 23 (3-5) of the Civil Aviation Act 
1964. the concept of "actual carrier' set 
out in section 18 of the Carriage by A1r 
Act 1967, and responsibilities TOr licensing 
by the actual earner set out ;n section 22 
of the Air Servrces Lrcensrng Act 1951 
ASPECTS OF THE NEW ARBITRATION 
COURT 
The Industrial Relations Amendment Act 
of 1977 received the gubernatorial assent 
on 21 December last and came mto force 
on 17 April 1978, by Order in Council : SR 
1978,99 The Industrial Court. which had 
come into existence on 8 March 1974 (SR 
1974/50) was thus extinguished - after 
some 49 months of operation - and re-
placed by the rev1ved Arbitration Court. By 
section 32 of the Industrial Relations Act 
1973 that short-lived Industrial Court had 
been "declared to be the same Court as 
that established by the Industrial Concilia-
tion and Arbitration Act 1954 and heretofore 
called the Court of Arbitration The amend 
ing legislation of 1977 subst1tutes a new 
section 32. to provide that the new Arbi-
tration Court "is hereby declared to be the 
same Court as that establlsned by (the 
1973 Act) and called. before the com-
mencement of the Industrial Relat1ons Act 
1977, the Industrial Court. " Parliament has 
thus provided mimmal comfort of continu-
ity, amidst the present and future shock of 
constant flux. 
By the transitional provis1ons contained 
in section 8 of the 1977 Act, all applica-
tions, actions, appeals, proceedings, refer-
rals, and other matters pending before the 
Industrial Court. but not determined or com-
pleted before 17 April 1978, may be deter-
mined and completed by the Arbitrat1on 
Court. The first decision ot the Arbitration 
Court, then. had actually been argued 
before the Industrial Court (in Taumarunui , 
on 7 and 8 February 1978) but 1udgment 
was rendered by the Chief Judge of the 
Arbitration Court The 1udgment, which 
received the historical enumeration ot " A.C 
1/78," is probably of no great importance 
to anyone but the part1es. but is a salutory 
reminder that a union may not negotiate 
an Award for workers outside its member-
ship rules: MacKenzie (Inspector of Awards) 
v Ali-Craft Boats Taumarunui Ltd; Arbitra-
tion Court. Taumarunui 24 April 1978 (A.C 
1/78). Jamieson C.J 
The plaintiff had sought a penalty from 
the defendant and arrears of wages for the 
benefit of two workers. under Clause 3 of 
the clearly relevant Northern Industrial Dis-
trict Shipwrights and Boatbuilders Collective 
Agreement (conciliated). recorded at 75 
B.A. 2987. The workers, who were unskilled 
assemblers of aluminium boats. had been 
pa1d under the Metal Workers Award The 
defendant successfully cla1med. however. 
that the purported extension ot the Ship-
wrights Collect1ve Agreement to unskilled 
workers was ultra vires the Northern lndus-
tnal District Ship, Yacht, and Boatbuilders 
I.U W because the membership rule of 
that union at the relevant time made no 
provision for assemblers and processors. 
Cit1ng 1/ A v Mayor of Wellington, 43 B A 
329, Jamieson C.J held that there was 
ample authority for the general proposition 
that a union cannot negotiate on behalf of 
workers who are not covered by an appro-
priate rule of t~e uni?n 
Several aspects of the "new" Arbitration 
Court deserve conside ration. Firstly, the 
whole package of industrial legislation has 
the a1r of permanence about it. The "Indus-
trial Law Reform Bill" was introduced and 
read a first lime on 8 November 1977 after 
extensive discussion in the Industrial Rela-
tions Council The name was changed to 
"Industrial Relations Amendment Bill" after 
clauses amending the a~rcrew Industrial 
Tnbunal Act. the Waterfront Industry Act 
and the Agricultural Workers Act were sev-
ered from the package and passed as 
separate amendments . Upon introducing the 
Bill , Mr Gordon, the Minister of Labour, 
had " no compunction in saying that we are 
trymg to get back to the same understand-
ing, rapport. and confidence enjoyed by the 
Arbitration Court - the same name - in 
the early 1960's, with the same personnel 
held in high esteem - a court that was 
really valued" 1977 N.Z P.O. 4250. Follow-
Ing a bewildering period when the wage 
fixing power has raoidly rotated through 
the old Court of Arbitration to a Remunera-
tion Authority to a Wages Authority to the 
Industrial Commission to Cabinet to the 
Wage Hearing Tribunal, the Government 
hopes, along with everyone else in the 
Industrial relations field , that the new "wage 
settlement procedure w1ll enjoy the 
confidence of the parties . " 1977 N Z 
PO 4247. 
Symbolic of this determination to create 





judictal destgn..,tton and satnries. Judge 
Jamteson of the lndustnal Court becomes 
Chief Judge Jamteson of the Arbitration 
Court and the thtrd htghest paid judge tn 
the land. After the Chief Justice of New 
Zealand (S3•'.777) and the Presrdent of the 
Court of Appeal (33.212), Jamieson C. J 
at $32.253. recetves a salary somewhat in 
excess of the $31.648 received by 1udges 
of the Court of Appeal and tne Supreme 
Court The two assoctates of Jamieson C 
J J R. P Horn J and N Wtlliamson J 
are to be patd at the rate of rudges of the 
Supreme Court Thts is an astounding 
arrangement, when one constders that 
judges of special tnbunals. such as the 
Chief Judge of the Maon Land Court, are 
usually paid on a lever wtth Magistrates 
($23 075) It wtll be interestinQ to watch 
the seating chart at the next formal state 
functiOn 
It snoutd also be noted that the three 
JUdges wtll not ordtnanly stt together on the 
bench. but will in fact only come together 
tnennially. under the Stale Services Condi-
tions of Employment Act 1977 s 32 (17), 
to measure the drift between the public 
sector and the private sector_ It is to be 
hoped in the name of const~tency and to 
avoid parties forurn shopptng 'hat the 
three JUdges wtll compare notes. Mr 
Gordon 1977 N Z P D 4251 
The clear tegtslattve tntent ts tnat all the 
stick• of rudtctal and arbilrC:IItonal wage 
ftxing power are now bound tnlo one 
fasces (used tn tiS anginal latin sense), 
and given to these three rucges Wage 
ftxing arbilratton and interpretation for 
publiC servants, agncultural workers, the 
quast-publlc waterfront workers and atr-
crcws, and the private sector plus the 
general wage order functton are all g1ven 
to these three rudges 
The posture of the new Ar01tration Court, 
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in questions of tnterprP.tation 01 awards and f 
agreements, may be substcanttally different 
from that of the Industrial Court. Mr Justtce 
Jamieson. in the lndustnal Court. applied 
strict rules of statutory Interpretation, citi ng 
Halsburys Laws of England on " Inte rpreta-
tion of Non-Testamentary Dc..cuments," and 
other toots of the lawyer traae, such as 
Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes 
and the Acts Interpretation Act 1924 See 
(1976) 1 NZJIR 20. 34 and 75, and (1977) 
2 NZJIR 23. The old Court or Arb ilralion, 
on the other hand. could, as law-interp reter. 
always understand the tntent of the law-
g.ver, stnce the arbitral a11d JUdiCial tunc-
liOns were combined 1n thcat one Court 
Where necessary, the court could redraft 
poorly drafted clauses and fill in a casus 
omissus, since, in theory. It had approved 
the original agreement. The Industrial Court 
dtd not have thts latitude and stood vis a 
vis awards as did the Supreme Court: 
Anderson v Couchman 40 B.A_ 114, 117. 
Once awards is ;ued under its aegis and 
1mpnmatur come back for tnterpretat10n, 
the new Arbitralton Court can return to the 
relaxed posture of the old Court of Arbitra-
lton, and avotd legalism when determining 
problems of tnterpretatton 
F1nallv. it should be noted thai the quest 
for certainty and permanence, so ardently 
sought by the Mmister of Labour may have 
already been undermined by hts own Prime 
Mmister_ No sooner had the Court Issued 
tiS first general wage order of 7%, with a 
cetltng of $7, than the Prime Minister was 
attacking the Court for 1gnoring the budget 
of next October Not only dia he criticize 
the order itself, but, more ominously, he 
threatened to amend the cntena which the 
Court must take into account tn fixing an 
order No one can have much confidence 
in an institutton 1f the Government changes 
the ground rules after every decision 
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